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I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MALTHUS'S 
THEORY OF METHOD 
The classical economics in England, starting from Adam Smith, 
developed into. the two currents of the Malthusian and Ricardian 
lines. Though the development became marked. after the days of 
Smith, his economics may be said to have contained the two elements 
which were actually developed by Malthus and Ricardo into their 
respective lines. 'These two political economists spring from Adam 
Smith, just as theologians start off from the Bible.,l) The two 
therefore might be called representative classical economists fol· 
lowing in the footsteps of Smith, but. at the same time holding 
1) ]. Bonar, Mal thus and his Work, 2nd ed. p. 209 
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opposite view·points. Generally speaking, the Smithian economics 
was theoretical as well as positive. Herein lies the origin of both 
the Malthusian positive economics and the Ricardian theoretical 
economics. And yet both were not the mere repetitions of the 
Smithian theories, making their own advance with the passing of 
the times. Smith developed the philosophy of wealth at the dawn 
of the Industrial Revolution, while Malthus probed into the cause 
of poverty at the zenith of the same period. And the Smithian 
economics gave priority to the theory of production, while the 
Ricardian developed the theory of distribution. The latter was cen-
tered around how to distribute the produced wealth among the 
classes of society. The Smith ian theory as a whole showed 
to a great extent a theological and metaphysical tendency, from 
which both Malthus and Ricardo broke away either positively or 
theoretically. Those three were one, however, in sticking to indio 
vidualism and liberalism. 
Malthus's positivism was thus the one which was thrdughly 
developed from one of the two elements of Smith, and Malthus 
was therefore categorically opposed to Ricardo. What then was 
its substance? The best product of Malthus's positivism is certainly 
his work, 'An Essay on the Principles of Population'. The book reads 
in part to the following effect: it is an acknowledged truth in philo-
sophy that a just theory will always be confirmed by experiment. 
Yet will there occur in practice a lot of confiictsan.d complicated 
circumstances such as almost unforeseeable by the most wise and 
penetrating man. There are few cases therefore where any theory can 
be pronounced just when it h'as not stood the test of experience. Thus 
viewed, it follows that an untried theory could not be suggested 
as probable, much less as just, unless all its opposing arguments 
have been well examined, and clearly and consistently confuted.''' 
As for the question of human advancement that Malthus took 
up for discussion in his" Principles of Population ", he had read 
with much interesf a few essays on the perfectibility of man and 
society. He was pleased and fascinated with the charming picture 
they set forth. He ardently wished for such happy improvements. 
But he thought great and unconquerable difficulties lay in the way 
to reach them. In other words, he supposed that the above specula-
tions were beyond proof with evidence . 
. Malthus did indeed doubt neither talents nor candour of the 
2) R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principles of Population, 1st ed; 1798, pp. 6-7 
-
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advocates for the perfectibility of mankind. However, their ability 
and penetration is one thing, and their rightness in arguments is 
another. In entering upon the argument, Malthus premises that he 
puts out of the question for the time being all mere conjectures. 
For example, a writer may tell us he thinks that man will ultima· 
tely become an ostrich. We can not here properly contradict him. 
But before he can expect to make any reasonable person agree with 
his view, he ought to show that the necks of mankind have been 
gradually becoming longer, that the lips have grown harder and 
more prominent, that the legs and feet are daily altering their 
shape, and that the hair is beginning to change into stubs of fea-
thers. Till' the probability of so wonderful a conversion can be 
shown, therefore, it is certainly a waste of time and eloquence to 
expatiate on the happiness of man in such a state, to describe his 
powers of running and flying, to paint him in a condition where 
all small luxuries would be despised, where he will be engaged 
only in collecting the necessaries of life, and where consequently 
each man's share of labour would be light and his portion of lei· 
sure ample. 
Starting now from no mere conjectures, but from the two pos-
tulates that no one can deny from the long experience of human· 
kind, Malthus resorted to positive methods in order to establish the 
steady and unshaken principles on population. First of the postu-
lata is that food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, 
that the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain 
nearly in its present state. To Malthus these two laws seem to 
have been fixed laws of our nature since weh ave had any knowl-
edge of mankind, and that as we have not hitherto seen any altera-
tion in them, we cannot conclude that they will ever cease to be 
what they are now, except when they are caused by an immedi· 
ate act of God who first created the system of the universe and 
for the benefit of his creatures stilI executes all its various 
operations in accordance with fixed laws. Assuming then these 
postulata as granted, Malthus has' drawn the conclusion with 
evidence that the power of population is much greater than the 
power of the earth to produce subsistence for man. 
The assumed postulata having been regarded as the fundamental 
principles which pervade human nature, the conclusion drawn from 
them wes also considered the steady and unshaken law. And they 
are the natural laws applicable not only to man, but to both the 
animal and vegetable kingdoms. The race of man cannot therefore 
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escape from it with· any efforts of reason. As a result there 
is wast~ of seed, sickness, and premature death among plants and 
animals, with misery and vice among mankind. Having the prin-
ciples of population thus drawn with evidence from the steady postu-
lata, we will have to turn down the arguments which are in favor 
of the perfectibility of man and society, and accordingly our 
foresight on social advam:ement will become pessimistic. Being 
reached with evidence. the conclusion may well be tinged with a 
melancholy hue. In the preface to 'The Principles on Population·'. 
MaIthus said with conviction that these dark tints were found 
really in the picture of life, and not drawn with a prejudiced eye 
or an inherent whims of disposition. The greater part of , The Princi-
ples on Population " therefore. is composed of both evidential 
arguments, which expatiate on the process of reaching the conclusion 
concerning the principles on population from the steady and un-
shaken postulata. and refutations without any evidence against their 
opposing arguments. It is of course uncertain whether the starting 
postulata are the unshaken axioms or the principles on population 
are a right conclusion. However, Malthus plainly intended to 
proceed with his positive methods of study, and this above all 
was characteristic of his political economy. 
In positivism, theory should precede evidence by which the for-
mer is to be proved. . The theory is sometimes assumed in a simple 
way. and accordingly can be modified, disproved. or confirmed with 
evidence, which itself is no theory at all. Theory. preceding evi· 
dence is neither mere conjecture nor assumption, but has indeed a 
definite foundation upon which it is to be formed, only the evidence 
serving to make practical Occurrences connected with the theory. 
On the contrary, Malthus, laying emphasis upon evidence, based the 
value of theory on practical occurrences rather than on the things 
upon which the theory stands. While giving priority to practical 
occurrences, therefore, he assumed a negative attitude toward the· 
oretical generalization. Such an attitude has greatly affected his 
'The Principles of Political Economy'. which was necessarily in 
need of a theoretical composition. 
In the 'Principles of Political Economy', Malthus considers that 
the principal cause of error and the differences now prevailing 
among the scientific writers on political economy, seems to be a 
rash attempt to simplify and generalize. While their more practical 
opponents draw too hasty inferences from frequently appealing to 
partial facts, these writers run into a .contrary extreme and do not 
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sufficiently weigh their theories by referring to their· rich and. 
comprehensive experience. To people of a certain type, nothing is 
more· fascinating than simplification and generalization. It is in-
deed desirable in philosophy whenever it can be done consistently 
with truth. That is the very reason, however, why we in almost. 
every science are likely to be led to crude and premature theories. 
In political economy too, our desire to simplify has not permitted 
more than one cause to operate in producing particuliar effects. 
And. if one cause could account for the most part of a certain 
phenomena, the whole has been ascribed to it without due atten-
tion being paid to the fact that they could not afford being so 
solved.') 
Malthus goes on to argue: we cannot certainly over-estimate 
Newton's admirable rule that we shall not admit more causes than 
the one which is necessary for the solution of the phenomena we 
are considering.. The rule itself however does not reject to admit 
those which really are necessary. Befor~ the shrine of truth which 
has been discovered by facts and experiences, the finest theories 
and the fairest classifications must crumble. The chemist of thirty 
years ago may well regret that new discoveries in the science should 
disturb his previous systems and arrangements, but he would 
not be qualified as a philosopher if he does not abandon them un-
grudgingly, as soon as the experiments refuting them are well es-
tablished. 
According to Maltus, the tendency to simplify and generalize 
which does not thus admit the operation of more than one cause 
will further produce a disinclination to allow of modifications, limi-
tations, and exceptions to a rule. It is an unscientific air indeed 
not to allow of them, and as a matter of fact there are many impor-
tant propositions in political economy which absolutely require 
modifications, limitations, and exceptions. And Malthus is convinc-
ed in saying that the frequent combination of complicated causes, 
the action and reaction of cause and effect on each other, and the 
necessity of· limitations and exceptions in many important propo-
sitions constitute in fact the main difficulties of the science, and 
frequently occasion mistakes in the predict;on of results. 
In the case of some principal writers on political economy, as 
Malthus says, the tendency to premature generalization make them 
hate to test their theories by experience. We must see to it that 
an undue stress shall not be laid upon isolated facts, or a consistent 
I) R. Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed. 1836, p.4 et seq. 
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theory shaII not be invalidated by a few discordant appearances 
whose validity has not yet deen properly examined. But it is certain 
that no theory can be accepted as correct, which is inconsistent 
with general experience. Then the inconsistency must be either 
radically false or essentially incomplete. In either case, it can 
neither be adopted as a satisfactory solution of current phenomena, 
nor acted upon safely in the future. 
Malthus considers that the first business of philosophy is to 
account for things as they are, and until our theories have been 
proved, any practical conclusion ought not to be based on them. 
His steady and unshaken confidence in the theory of population 
also would not exist, if it was not confirmed by the state of society 
as it actually exists in every country we know. And in establishing 
the theory, Malthus says he has confirmed it by appealling to 
the facts such as mentioned ab::lVe. In dealing with most of the 
subjects of political economy, where various and complicated 
causes are often in operation, it is pre'eminently necessary for us 
to appeal to this kind of experience. A theory may appear to be 
correct, and so also under given premises, which may further ap· 
pear to be the same as those under which the theory will be applied. 
A hitherto unobserved difference, however, will make its appear-
ance sometiI!1es when the results different from those expected 
show themselves, and under these circumstances, the theory may 
well be considered as failing. Therefore, he says that where 
unexpected causeS may be operating and the foreseeable causes 
are easily subject to great changes in strength and efficacy, an accu-
rate and comprehensive attention to facts is indispensable for the 
purpose of both preventing the accumulation of erroneous theories, 
and confirming and sanctioning just and correct theories. 
Now, political economy is, according to Malthus, essentiallY 
practical and applicable to the common business of human life, and 
in no branch of human knowledge false views may do more harm 
or just views do more good than in political economy. The study 
of the laws of nature is interesting in all its branches, and even the 
physical laws which govern the very distant parts of the universe 
and which is hard for man to influence, may be noble and rational 
objects of curiosity. The laws, however, which control movements 
of human society will more strongly require our attention, perhaps 
because they concern the objects we are daily and hourly connected 
with, and because their effects are always modified by hUman inter· 
ference, 
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. Some eminent persons are so much attracted to the general 
rules of political economy that they do not consider it wise and 
polite to pay attention to some exceptions, which from time to time 
happen as they know, fearing that they might thus direct the public 
attention too much and too' often to the exceptions. Malthus, of 
course, does not agree with them. There is then another group of 
persons who highly value the acknowledged general rules of polit-
ical economy as practically useful to the most extensive degree_ On 
the other hand, for instance, in mathematics, chemistry, and every 
branch of .natural science, we encounter such a large number 
of research necessary to their development and completion, 
which taken separately seem to be contributing to no useful pur-
pose. It follows therefore that many useful inventions as well as 
much valuable and improving knowledge would have been lost, if a 
rational cudosity and a mere love of information had not been ge-
• 
nerally acknowledged to be a sufficient motive for the search after 
truth_ 
In the same vein, Malthus considers that even if further inqui-
ries in political economy do not always bear the rigid application 
of the te£t of f cui bono f, it is by no means conclusive against 
them. But being in fact so intimately connected in nature with the 
business of mankind, he believes, propositions of political economy 
will bear this test rather than those of any other branch. of human 
knowledge. It is certainlY a difficult task in many cases to trace 
distinctly the operations of causes and effects in political economy 
acting and re-acting on each other, with a view to foreseeing their 
results and accordingly laying down· general rules. But there is 
scarcely any inquiry concerning these subjects, however deep and 
remote it may seem at first sight, which is not in some way or 
other directly connected with practice. It is highly desirable, there-
fore, that such inquiries should be pursued in order to improve and 
complete the political economy and then to expect from it the prac-
tical advantages. It is furthermore not advisable that any common 
difficulty or obscurity should be allowed to obstruct those who have 
enough time and ability for such researches. 
In many cases, it may be in fact impossible to make precise 
predictions of effects due to the complicated causes in operation, the 
different degrees of strength and efficacY with which they operate, 
and the numerous unforeseeable circumstances which are likely 
to occasion interference. However the most important knowledge 
will be such as able to draw a fairly definite line between the case 
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where the foreseen effects are certain and the case- where they' are 
doubtful, and further in the latter case be able to make a satiSfactory-
explanation of the reasons of such uncertainty. The next in impor--
tance is to know what cannot be done, and why we cannot do it. 
The first is considered to enable us to do a positive good, to 
strengthen our powers, and to enlarge our happiness; and the second 
to save us from both the evils of ineffective attempts and the loss and· 
misery that come from perpetual failure. 
Such is the inquiry of political economy as characterized by 
Malthus. One of the specific objects of his 'Principle of Political 
Economy', therefore, was said to make some general rules of polit-
ical economy for practical application by- frequently referring to-
experience and by taking a comprehensive view of all the causes-
that work together in the occurrence of particular phenomena_ But' 
in such a mode of inquiry, we are likely to fall into errors arising 
from a tendency to simplification. Some appearances, ;"'hich are 
in fact merely co-existent and incidental, may be taken as causes: 
And Ii theory established on this mistake will be uniting the double 
disadvantage of being complex and incorrect. Adam Smith had-
particularly fallen into this error, drawing inferences from the 
actual appearances which were not warranted by general principles, 
and that was an error into which -Malthus took a special caution 
not to fall. Being conscious, however, of his liability to this error 
on the one side, and to that of not refering properly to experience 
on the other, Malthus considered that his aim would be to pursue 
as just a mean as possible between the extremes in order to approach 
the goal of truth. 
Though the argument Malthus so far developed . is apparently 
moderate to a high degree, at the same time it is not to be over-
looked that his political economy is actually opposed to that of 
Ricardo's which stands on abstract theories_ Malthus himself even-
tually confessed to be in opposition to Ricardo, notwithstanding he is 
endeavor to abstain from controversial arguments in his 'Prin-
ciples on Political Economy'. The opposition between both 
was noticed by Ricardo as well, which was referred to in his letter 
of 1817 to Malthus. According to the letter, one great cause of their 
difference in opinion on .the subjects which they had so often discuss-
ed was that Malthus had always' in his- mind the immediate and~ 
temporary effects of particular changes, while Ricardo put these 
immediate and temporary effects quite aside, and fixed his whole 
attention on the permanent state of things which would result from 
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them. And the letter went .on to say that perhaps Malthus estimated 
these temporary effects too highly, while Ricard) was too· much 
disposed to undervalue them. To which Malthus llgreedfrankly in 
his reply too.') 
Their opposition showed itself not only in preference given to 
either general rules or exceptions, but also in the fact that Ricardo 
tried to penetrate the essence behind outward appearances, while 
Malthus always followed after the changing forms of phenomena, 
thereby causing the formation of the two quite different political 
economics. From this view'point, will be made an attempt to view 
the fundamental theories of Malthusian political economy. 
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MAL THUS'S 
THEORY OF VALUE 
Let· us see what Malthus thinks about value .. Malthus starts to 
think, just as Smith has done, by distinguishing value in use from 
value in exchange.l) . Value in exchange is the relation of one com· 
modity to others in exchange, and it is dependent upon the will 
and power to exchange of the parties concerned. When· the recip' 
rocal desire exists between them, the rate of exchange will depend 
upon their reciprocal relative estimation founded on the desire and 
difficulty to possess. And as the desires of individuals and their 
powers of producing are" of necessity different, the contrasts thus 
made· will probably be very different, at the outset, from each other. 
After a certain period of repeated exchanges, however, a sort of 
average might be expected to be formed, ther~by establishing a cur· 
rent value of all commodities. 
Each commodity wi1l thus measure the relative values of all 
others, and be in turn measured by any of them. Each commodity 
also represents a value. Each commodity will thus have more or less 
accurately and conveniently the two essential properties of money, 
that is, those of being both a representative and a measure of 
value. Of all the commodities to be exchanged, precious metals 
are generally selected as money, and the kind of value designated by 
them is called nominal value or price. 
In comparing two commodities. the power of one to purchase 
4) Letters of D. Ricardo to T.R. Malthus 1810-1823, ed. by J. Bonar, 1887,' p.127, 
J.M. Keynes, Essays in Biography, 1933, p.139, 
1) R. Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed. 1836, p. 50 et seq. 
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the other, as Malthus mentioned above, will depend upon two kinds 
of causes, that is, first, upon the causes that affect the desire to 
possess and the difficulty of possessing one of them, and secondly, 
upon the causes that affect the desire to possess and the difficulty 
of possessing the other. The causes which affect the desire to pos-
sess and the difficulty of possessing a commodity may be called 
the intrinsic cause of its power of purchasing. On the other 
hand, the causes which affect the desire to possess and the difficulty 
of possessing all the other commodities with which the first one can be 
exchanged may be called the extrinsic cause of its power of pur-
chasing. The exchangeable value of a commodity can only be pro-
portionate to its general power of purchasing so long as the commo-
dities with which it is exchanged continue to be obtained with the 
same facility. As it is known by experience, however, that a great 
number of commodities do not continue to be obtained with the 
same facility, Malthus considers that when we speak of the varia-
tions in the exchangeable value of a particular commodity, they 
refer almost invariably to its power of purchasing arising from 
intrinsic causes. 
As mentioned above by Malthus, exchangeable value is the 
relation of one commodity to others in exchange_ And when the 
introduction of money has made distinction between buyers and 
sellers, the demand may be defined as the will of buyers combined 
with their power to buy, and the supply as the quantity of commo-
dities combined with the desire to sell them. Viewed thus, the 
value of commodities in money or their prices will be determined 
by their demand compared with their supply. In this connection 
we should never forget that when prices are said to be determined 
by demand and supply, it is not meant that they are determined 
either by the demand alone or by the supply alone, but by their 
relation to each other. 
Therefore, the factor which raises prices is not merely the ex-
tent of actual demand, nor even the extent of actual demand com-
pared with the extent of the actual supI;lly. It is just such a chang:" 
in the relation between demand and supply, as makes it necessary 
for us to express a greater demand when we want either to 
divide peacefully an actual produce, or to prevent the future produce 
of the same kind from becoming short. In the same way, the 
factor which lowers prices is merely neither the extent of actual supply, 
nor the extent or supply compared with the demand, as make it 
necessary for prices to fall, when we w(lnt to remove a temporary 
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abundance, or to prevent a constant excess of supply which would 
accompany a decline in the costs of production if the price of pro-
duce does not proportionately decrease. If the terms demand and 
supply be understood used in the way mentioned, as Malthus 
considers, no case will be found where they will not determine any 
price, whether temporary or permanent_ 
In opposition to the preceding view there stands a view that 
the permanent prices of a great number of commodities will be 
determined by their production cost_ This is undoubtedly true, as 
Malthus says, if the production cost includes all the component 
parts of price which were stated by Adam Smith. Yet, it is just 
the principle of demand and supply that determines the prices of 
commodities, independent of any considerations of cost and of the 
ordinary wages, profits, and rent spent in their production. And 
this principle does not work only permanently on the kind of com-
modities which can be considered to be monopolies. It is found to 
work temporarily and immediately as well on all commodities, and 
strikingly and pre-eminently also on all kinds of raw produce. It 
is therefore to be admitted that with regard to a class of cmmodities 
of the greatest extent the current market prices are, when fixed, 
determined by a principle different from the cost of production. 
There is then another class of commodities, such as manufac-
tured goods, where current market prices more often coincide with 
the costs of production and particularly when the raw material is 
cheap. Even in this case, however, our daily experience shows that 
any alteration in the relation of demand to supply will plainlY overcome 
the influence of .these costs. Furthermore, when we examine the 
matter more .closely, we will find that the cost of production itself 
only influences the prices of these commdoities, considering that 
the payment of this cost is just the necessary condition of their 
continued supply. - If this be true, then, Malthus concludes that 
the law of demand and supply will determine what Adam Smith call-
ed natural price as well as what he called market price. 
MaIthus thinks that no change can take place in the market 
price of commodities, when some previous change does not occur 
in the relation of demand to supply. He then goes on to question 
whether the same argument is true in reference to natural prices. 
This question should of course be determined by paying due atten-
tion to the nature of the change occasioned in the state of demand 
and supply by an alteration in the cost of production, and particu-
larly to the circumstances which specifically and immediately has 
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caused the price to change. In this connection, it may be allowed 
that when the cost of pro::luction decreases, a fall of price will almost 
invariably result. But what is it that specifically makes the prices 
of commodities to faIl? Malthus answers that it is an actual or 
contingent excess of supply. In the same way, it may be acknowl· 
edged that increase in the cost of production causes the prices of 
commodities to rise. But what is it that specifically makes the 
prices to rise? Malthus answers that it is also an actual or contigent 
shortage of supply. Wanting these actual or contigent variatio::Js of 
the supply; in other words, the extent of the supply remaining just 
the same without excess or shortage, whether the cost of production 
rises or falls, there would then be no slightest reason for supposing 
that any variation of price would take place. 
Thus viewed, Malthus's argument comes·to the conclusion that 
the relation of supply to demand is the principle predominantly 
determining market or natural price, and that the cost of produc· 
tion can be only subordinate to it in operation, that is, because it 
affects the ordinary relation of supply to demand. In Malthus's posi· 
tivism, it is not considered necessary to resort to imaginary 
cases in order to fortify this conclusion, considering that actual 
experience shows the principle in the clearest light. 
The most conspicuous instance that the cost of production is 
not decisive in fixing prices is found, according to MaIthus, in the 
artificial value which is given to bank·notes by limiting their a· 
mount. This has always been found true in our experience If we 
can limit the supply of notes, so that it will not exceed the quantity 
of gold which would circulate if the currency. were metallic, 
the notes will always be kept at the same value as· gold. It is 
the same principle which Ricardo acknowledged as well. And Mal· 
thus is confident Ricardo has admitted that if this .limitation could be 
completely made even when the j:aper is not exchangeable for 
gold, its value would not be altered as long as the same demand 
for a circulating medium continued. If the bank'notes, Malthus 
continues, which cost almost nothing to make, can be kept at the 
value of gold by being supplied in the same quantity then it 
proves clearly that the value of gold itself does not depend upon 
the cost of its production, but this cost only affects the supply 
compared with the demand, and that even if the cost was wanting, 
when the supply was not increased compared with the demand, the 
value of gold would still remain the same. 
Generally, the phenomenon of value is not imaginary, but nei· 
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ther is its existence perceptible through the senses. We are not con· 
scious of the phenomenon of value, just as we are of the phenom' 
enon of price in our daily life. But the existence of the former is 
undeniable. As the law of gravitation is to be certified logically, 
so value is a logical existence. Again, as the law of gravitation is 
ascertainable by the observation of the phenomenon of each motion, 
so the phenomenon is to be known by the phenomenon .of each 
value. The phenomenon of value is a regulative and logical exist· 
ence which controls each empirical phenomenon of value. It reo 
flects itself in the mind, a'ld operates through the mind, though it is 
actually no mere mental phenomenon. What we call a positive 
clarification of the phenomenon of value is in fact its direct 
effect which eventually will be leading to logical information on 
the relation of values. The positivistic Malthus tries to explain 
things as they are; only it must not be a mere description of 
things, but an attempt to clarify logically an inner relation of 
phenomenon. An actual proof should not take the place of such 
logical argument. 
Now, it is the relation of demand to supply that determines 
value, as Malthus considers, and this argument has been inferred 
positively, as they say, and 'confirmed empirically. It is not price 
itself, but alteration in price that is determined by the relation. 
Then the determination of price itself will come to the fore, but it 
is no other question than of the decision of value. The fact is that 
there ought to exist theoretical problems behind practical problems 
of value which could be confirmed empirically. To this point did 
the Malthus's positivism seem to close its eyes. But Smith and 
Ricardo distinguished between market price and natural price, and 
as a matter of fact the former is the problem of price and the 
latter is that of value. That the former was taken as a temporary 
phenomenon came from the consideration of the fact that price 
changes continually according to alteration in. the relation of de· 
mand to supply; and that the latter was thought permanent came 
from the consideration of what concerns value, existing behind the 
former's changes. As for Malthus, however, he considered that the 
law of demand and supply would determine not only market price, but 
also natural price. That is, the cost of production, which is general· 
ly considered to determine natural price, will influence the prices 
of commodities through the supply, as the payment of this cost is 
the necessary condition of their continued supply. He further says 
that even natural price is not exempt from the control by demand 
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and supply. It may be true that price thus is uniformly defined, 
but the essential meaning of price has been forgotten. In this 
connection, Ricardo states thus: Malthus forgets Smith's definition 
of natural price, otherwise he would not say that demand and 
supply could determine natural price; natural price is only another 
name for cost of production. Malthus argues that when the relation 
of demand to supply does not change, whether the cost of produc-
tion rises or falls, there will take place no variation of price. That 
makes it the more necessary to know how it is that the relation of 
demand to supply changes, if it occurs. That is the point the theo-
ries of the cost of production, natural price and value are trying ta 
account for. It is admitted by every bJdy that demand and supply 
govern market price, but what is it that determines supply. at a 
particular price? Ricarda tOJ argues that it is the cost of produc-
tion." Pursuing positively, as is called, the phenomena of demand 
and supply, Malthus has failed to solve his subject in view. That 
the question of price thus cannot be handled merely along the line 
of the relation of demand to supply is just the reason why we 
ought to foresee the theory of value develop behind the question. 
Malthus tries to prove the absoluteness of the law of demand and 
supply by saying that the value of the inconvertible paper would be 
determined by the demand and supply of it, but the law is not the 
fundamental factor to decide the value of the paper. At the outset 
of his argument, Malthus was compelIed to consider whether paper 
issue shalI exceed or not the quantity of gold money, which shall 
circulate rightly without paper circulation. But the decision of value 
of the paper in that case is the first question to solve, and without 
it we could not define properly the value of the paper in general. 
Herein lies the standard upon which alterations of the value of the 
paper shall be regulated by the demand and supply. 
However, Malthus did not mean to say that labour and the cost 
of production have nothing at all to do with prices; only they are 
the necessary conditions for the supply of commodities. Such a cost 
of production S!llith calls the natural price. But Malthus calIs it the 
necessary price, which means that it is necessary for carrying com-
modities regularly to the market. And these natural and necessary 
prices will be regulated by the principle of demand and supply as 
well as market prices. The only difference is that the former is 
regulated by the ordinary and average relation of demand to sup-
., D. Ricardo, Note on Malthus' "Principles of Political Economy", 1928, p. 19 
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ply,· and the latter is determined by the extraordinary and acciden· 
tal relation of demand and supply. 
Therefore, Malthus does not mean to say that there is no such 
thing as natural price. .when explained as Smith has done, it is not 
only an intelligible, but a useful term. If the natural price of a 
commodity be considered as composed 1) of all the money wages 
which have been paid for the specific kinds of labour required in 
the various parts of the process of producing the commodity, 2) of 
all the money profits of the other capital employed during the pe· 
riods of various length for which they have been advanced, and 3) 
of all the money rent connected with the necessary materials and 
food obtained by the assistance of those powers of nature which 
belong to the soil -- then, assuming that circumstances are in 
their ordinary and natural state and taxes are not imposed, this 
price and the ordinary and average prices of commodities will quite 
certainly be found to agree with each other. To the price, which 
is fairly and usefully called the natural, necessary, or ordinary price, 
the market prices are always going to agree. And this price determines 
the rates at which commodities are usually exchanged for each other. 
So understood. Malthus considers, nothing can be more simple, or 
more· generally applicable. 
As mentioned above, Malthus does not necessarily deny the 
idea of natural price, though he tried to neglect its ordinary mean· 
ing, in the structure of the determination of value. He considers 
that natural price is regulated by the ordinary and average relation 
of demand to supply, while market price is determined by the extra' 
ordinary and accidental relation. What will determine, then, the 
ordinary and average relation of demand to supply? Of a large num· 
ber of relations, which will become ordianry and average? The 
relation itself does never determine itself naturally, as is called. It 
follows therefore that the relation is not an idea serving as a final 
definition of price. Malthus further says the natural price is a use· 
ful idea as well, considering that it is a price necessary for carrying 
regularly commodities to the market. It may certainly be a useful 
idea, but Malthus does not necessarily consider that such natural 
price or the so·called necessary price will be the foundation of the 
law of demand and supply. 
Now, in Malthus's theory of value, the question of the determi-
nation of value will develop itself into the question of the mea-
sures of value, and herein also is found the undercurrent of his posi-
tivism. Here first of all he strictly distinguishes the causes of value 
16 S. KiSHIMOT6 
from the measure of value. He argues that the labour worked up 
in a commodity is the principal cause of value, but it is not a mea· 
sure of it. The labour which a commodity wiIl command is not the 
cause of its value, but the measure of it. A measure of value is 
wanted for two purposes. The first of them is to measure easily 
and conveniently the relative values of all commodities, comparing 
them with one another, and thus to enable all dealers to. estimate 
the profits they may make when they sell the commodities. This 
purpose is completely satisfied by money. The second is to mea· 
sure the difficulty with which a commodity is obtained, including all 
the conditions of its supply, and then to enable us to ascertain in 
which commodity and to what extent in each commodity the change 
has taken place when two or more commodities have in the course 
of time altered in their exchangeable relations to each other. This 
is the most important information, particularly concerning commodi· 
ties in the same country at different times. As money, however, 
over a period of some length is liable to alter greatly in its ex-
changeable value which arises from intrinsic causes, it is impossible 
to use this information as a measure. 
Malthus examines Smith's views on this· question. The latter's 
argument that labour is a universal and accurate measure of value, 
the former considers, has introduced some confusion into the matter. 
Smith argues sometimes that the value of a commodity is determin-
ed by the quantity of labour which is employed in its production, 
and sometimes by the quantity of labour which it will command in 
exchange. It is on the latter sense however that Smith has laid 
stress, so says Malthus. 
And when we consider, according to Malthus, the degree to 
which labour is fitted to be a measure of· value in the first sense 
used by Smith, in other words, in reference to the quantity of 
labour which has been used in the production of a commodity, we 
shaH find it radicaIly defective. The reaSon has been explained on 
the foHowing two points.') 
In the first place, Malthus. says, a moment's consideration will 
show us that it cannot be applied in a positive sense. It is indeed 
almost a contradiction in words to say that the exchangeable velue 
of a commodity is proportionate to the quantity of labour used on 
it. Exchangeable value, as the word means, is evidentIyvalue in 
exchange for some other commodities. When more labour, however, 
3) R. Malthus, Prio ciples of Political Economy, 1st ed. pp. 85-88 
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is used on one commodity, and also more labour is used on the 
others for which it is exchanged, the exchangeable value of the 
first commodity cannot obviously be proportionate to the labour 
used 01;1 it. If, for instance, the labour of producing corn increases 
and at the same time the labour of producing money and many 
other commodities increases, it will be at once impossible for us to 
say that more or less value of alI things be proportionate to more 
or less labour used in their production. Although in this case more. 
labour has been used on corn, a bushel of corn will obviously 
exchange fo.r no more money nor labour than before. ThEm it 
follows that the exchangeable value of corn has certainly not altered 
proportionate to the additional quantity of labour which has been· 
employed in its production. 
In the second place, even if we understand this measure in a 
relative sense, in other words, even if we think that the exchange· 
able value of commodities is determined by the comparative quantity' 
of labour used on each, there exists no stage of society in which it 
will be found correct. In the very earliest periods, as a matter of 
fact, when not only land was in common, but also almost no capital 
waS used to assist manual labour, exchange would be constantly 
made without reference to the quantity of labour which might have 
been employed for each commodity. Most of the objects exchange' 
able maybe raw products of various kinds, such as birds, fish, 
fruits, etc., concerning which the effects of labour are' always. 
uncertain. One man might have engaged in five days' labour in 
obtaining an object which he would later be glad to exchange for 
some other object that might have cost a more fortunate 
labourer only two, or perhaps one day's endeavour. And this 
proportion between the exchangeable value of objects and· the 
labour whlch was used in their production would have constantly 
occurred. 
In addition, there is in fact almost no stage of society, however 
barbarous, as Malthus thinks, where the cost 9f production is con· 
fined exclusively to labour. Even at a very early period, profits 
will be found to enter largely into the question of exchangeable 
value as a necessary condition of supply. It is obviously necessary 
that even to make a bow and arrow wood and reed should be. 
properly dried and seasoned. And the time during which these 
materials must be kept by the workman till his work is completed, 
introduces immediately a new element into the computation of 
value. We may estimate the labour used in any kind of capital just 
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on the same principle as the labour used in the direct production" 
of a commodity. But, Malthus considers that the varying degree of 
quickness in which the returns are made is quite a new element, 
which is never related to the quantity of labour used on the capital, 
and moreover, in every period of society, whether the earliest or 
the latest, is the most important in the determination of the value 
of exchange. 
Thus, according to Malthus, it is clear concerning intrinsic value 
in exchange that the value of the labour actually used in the 
production of a commodity, will never present or be proportionate 
to the value of the completed commodity, except in the rare case 
where the labour alone is used and the produce is carried immedi· 
ately to the market. In the majority of cases, there are, in addi· 
tion to the labour actually used, other intrinsic causes of value, 
which increase the difficulty of obtaining the desirable objects and 
act sometimes with great power. This truth can be easily found at 
any period and in any place, that is, the quantity of labour actually 
used in the production of commodities satisfies neither of the two 
great objects of a measure of value. The quantity of labour does 
not measure the rate at which commodities exchange, like money, 
with each other at the same place and time. It does not also meas· 
ure the whole difficulty to be overcome or the sacrifice to be 
made in obtaining commodities at the same or different times and 
countries. And thUS, when more than two commodities have varied 
in relation to each other, the quantity of labour does not enable us 
to say in which of them and to what extent in each the variations 
have taken place.') 
It is quite obvious that an attempt to define the [ormation of 
value in reference to the relation of demand to supply would lead 
us to a very great predicament. The fact is that, the unchangeable· 
ness of a measure of labour which Malthus sought after is difficult 
to be deduced from the relation of demand to supply, considering 
that the law of demand and supply is the principle of exposition on" 
alterations. MaIthus may well have roamed about seeking for a 
measure of labour. Malthus examined into embodied labour, there· 
fore, coming back to the theory of a value of labour, from which 
he had started in his arguments. As mentioned above, however, it 
is difficult to consider the quantity of labour necessary for the 
production of" commodities as a measure of value now that Malthus 
" R. Malthus, op. cit. 2nd Oed. pp. 92-93. 
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rejected the theory of a value of labour in regard to the forma-· 
tion of value, but the labour considered by Malthus being a sepa-
rate labour, he would have reached a standstill in accounting for a 
measure of labour even if he had resorted to the theory of a value 
of labour. 
Upon the principle that the labour which has been used in the 
production of a commodity is at the same time a measure of real and 
relative value, it may be considered in the formation of a measure 
of value that if any article were to be found which would at all 
times need the same quantity of labour in its production, it might 
be used as an accurate and standard measure of value.' Malthus 
acknowledged however that precious metals have not this quali-
ty. As a matter of fact, the world has been supplied at different 
periods from mines of different degrees of productivity. This 
difference of productivity necessarily means that different quanti· 
ties of labour are at different times required in the production 
of the same quantity of metal. Moreover, the different degrees of 
skill employed at different times in the working of mines are the 
source of variableness in the quantity of labour which has been 
employed to bring to the market a given weight of coin. 
Any kind of regularity in the production of the precious metals, 
so considers Malthus, cannot possibly make the money prices of 
commodities a correct measure of the quantity of labour which has 
been used on them in the same or different countries and at the 
same or different times; not so even if all countries were in posses-
sion of mines of their own, and still less if most of them were 
obliged to purchase their money from other countries. How far 
the precious metals in such circumstances, however, may be a good 
measure of the exchangeable value of commodities is another ques-
tion. The precious metals, in whatever way they may be obtained, 
are generally a correct measure of exchangeable value at the same' 
time and in the same place. And it is certain that the less subject 
to variation are the ways of obtaining them, the more they come 
nearer to a measure of exchangeable value at different times and 
places. If each nation could at all times obtain them by the same 
quantity of labour without any advances of capital, then, with the excep-
tion of the temporary disorders occasioned by foreign trade and the 
sudden invention of machinery, the exchangeable value in money 
with regard to the labour which it would command, would be the 
same in alI countries and at alI times_ In this supposed case, that 
is, in the case where the cost of precious metals in labour can ever 
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be the same as their exchangeable value in labour, money - would 
certainly be of a uniform value, as it would at all times cost and 
command the same quantity of labour. Malthus has seen however 
that concerning those commodities where some kind of· capital was 
used, their values compared with the precious metals or each other 
could never be proportionate to the labour which they have cost. 
Here Malthus expected much from the precious metals as a 
measure of value, but it was under very limited conditions. The 
fact is that as Malthus has treated the precious metals too as a 
commodity his definition of a measure of value is not more than 
the definition of it according to the separate labour, overlooking thus 
the formation of money as a general form of equivalent. And 
particularly, the individual difference of value of precious metals, 
which Malthus referred to, from the mines of different degrees of 
productivity is the source of forming the so·called mine land·rent, 
and does not keep the precious metals from assuming a general· 
form of equivalent. 
Then, what about the commanded labour as a measure of la· 
bour? Malthus allowed as mentioned above that in the same place 
and in moderately short periods of time the precious metals are a 
satisfactory measure of the relative values of commodities. He also 
considered that what is true of· the precious metals with respect to 
the relative and nominal values of commodities is true of com· 
manded labour as well. For instance, in the same place and at the 
:fame time the different quantities of day labour which different 
quantities can command, will be exactly proportionate· to their 
relative value In exchange. And if any two· of them will buy the 
same quantity of labour of the same kind, they will invariably ex· 
change with each other. 
MaIthus further extends the above argument in reference to 
labour to all kinds of commodities. Namely, in the same place and 
at the same time every commodity may be considered as an accu· 
rate measure of the relative values of others, and what has been 
said of labour may be said of woolen cloth, cotton, iron, etc. Any 
two commodities, which at the same time and in the same place 
will purchase or command the same quantity of woolen - cloth; 
cotton, iron, etc., will have the same value or exchange with each 
other. This may be certainly true, if we take the same time pte~ 
cisely, but Malthus says that if we take different periods the com-
parison will utterly fail. 
Gropirig among invested labour, precious metals, commanded 
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labour" woolen cloth, cotton, iron, etc, for an unchangeable m€asure 
of value, Malthus did not obtain a satisfactory object. The· rel'!so.~ 
for this is that not only did he lay the basis of the formation of 
value on the relation of demand to supply, but also the labour- he 
handled was no more than separate labour and he overlooked bo~h 
the process in which a general form' of equivalent is forl11ed <lIld 
the labour in that case. Malthus accordingly failed to develop the 
theory of, a measure of value. He onlY entertained an idea that 
money practically makes a much better measure of valu~ than' any 
other commodity. The most important reason for it, Malthus' llays, 
is that the relation of money to common labour not only changes 
., '. . 
more slowly than woolen cloth, cotton, iron, etc., but as money has 
been adopted as the almost universal medium of exchange, its relation 
to labour must always be known to the inhabitants of that place, And 
while such a relation is known and remains unchanged, th(l money 
price of commodities will not only express their relation to each 
other, but also the difficulty of obtaining them, the conditions of 
their continued supplY, and the supply compared with the demand 
in whatever state they may be, Malthus infers then that under such 
circumstances, that is, while the relation of money to labour is 
known and remains unchanged, money is a measure of both relative 
and intrinsic value in exchange. 
According to Malthus, as mentioned above, in regard to com· 
modities produced by labour alone and brought to market immedi-
ately, the labour used upon them must on, an a rage be precisely 
the same as the labour which they will command_ But the rela-
tions of all commodities to one another, however variously com-
posed, are at the same time and in the same place in exact proportion 
to the quantity of labour which they will respectively command. 
Whether arising from the intrinsic cause of labour alone, or from 
labour combined in various proportions with profits, rent, and taxes, 
or affected by temporary scarcity or abundance, the ·value of any 
commodity in any case will be measured by the quantity of each 
period which it will command. 
Malthus further considers that labour, like all other commodi-
ties, varies more or less in quantity compared with the demand for 
it, and at different times and in different countries it commands 
very different quantities of the first necessity of life_ Furthermore, 
according to the different degrees of skill and assistance of machi-
nery with which labour is used, the products of labour are not propor-
tio.nate to. the quantity of labour, It follows therefore that labour, 
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in any sense in which the word can be used, cannot be -considered 
as an accurate and standard measure of real value in exchange." 
Thus Malthus thinks that no commodity generaIly can be consid-
ered as a standard measure of real value in exchange. Corn and 
labour, however, might in some cases be a better measure of real 
value in exchange, than one alone, and yet be sufficiently manage-
able for practical application. Namely, a certain quantity of corn of 
a given quality, as Malthus considers, has always a definite and 
unchangeable value in use on account of its ability of supporting a 
certain number of human beings. But both real and nominal value 
of corn in exchange is subject to considerable variations in every 
century as weI! as every year. Our experience shows that popula-
tion and cultivation do not always proceed with equal steps in 
spite of their mutual dependence on each other but are subject to 
remarkable changes in the velocity of their movements. Putting aside 
annual· changes, corn seems sometimes to be dear for many years 
compared with labour and other commodities, and sometimes cheap 
for the similar periods compared with the same objectg. Conse-
quently, Malthus's positivism shows that every century as weIl as every 
year a given quantity of corn measures very imperfectly the quan-
tity of the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of life which 
any particular commodity will command in exchange. 
Then Malthus argues that the same observation will be true of 
day-labour, the measure proposed by Adam Smith, that is, that 
labour also makes its value vary every century and accordingly 
cannot be every century an accurate measure of real value in 
exchange. 
Malthus thus considers that these two objects,. taken singly, 
cannot be considered as a satisfactory measure of value, but by 
combining the two we may perhaps approach a more accurate 
measure. The fact is that when corn compared with labour isdear, 
labour compared with corn must necessarily be cheap. Namely, at 
a period w.hen a given quantity of corn will command the· greatest 
quantity of the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of life, a 
given quantity of labour will always command the smallest quantity 
of such objects. And at a time when corn commands the smallest, 
labour will command the greatest, quantity of them. If then we 
take a mean between the two measures above mentioned, Malthus 
says, we shall have a measure corrected by the contemporary 
'j R.. M~lthu., <!p. cit. 1st· ed. p. 125 et seq. 
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changes in each in opposite directions, And this measure will then 
represent more justly than either of the two the same quantity of 
the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of life at the most 
distant periods and under all the varying circumstances to which the 
progress of population and cultivation is subject. 
After hard work to seek after an invariable measure of value, 
Malthus reached as a conclusion a mean value of corn and labour. 
This was certainly his last resort. It is doubtful, however, whether 
corn and labour will always vary in different directions, and Ricardo 
also actually was opposed to this point.') The conclusion of course 
was not reached by Malthus with satisfaction. He therefore consid-
ered it with care afterwards, as the result publishing in 1823 his 
work, 'The Measure of Value (stated and illustrated, with an appli-
cation of it to the alterations in the value of the English currency 
since 1790).' Making again in this book a series of inquiries center-
~ed around Smith's views, he reached the conclusion that the labour 
which commodities will command may be considered as a standard 
measure of their natural and exchangeable value.1} This is obviously 
different from the conclusion concerning a mean between corn and 
labour in the 1st edition of 'The Principles of Political Economy'. 
Considering the necessity of correcting this point, Malthus did so 
frankly in 'The Measure of Value', by saying with conviction that 
he was wrong in his views concerning a mean measure and the 
labour alone is the true measure. And thus the paragraph describ-
ing a mean measure was deleted in the 2nd edition of 'The· Princi-
ples of Political Economy' as well. But he considers that labour as 
a measure of value is the commanded labour, the quantity of la-
bour which a commodity commands is representing the conditions 
of its supply, that is, its natural value. Then it follows that a final 
and decisive factor in the formation of value is not such a com-
manded labour, but the relation of demand to supply, and therefore 
their dominion as to prices and value is absolutely universal. From 
this vieW-point, it might be said that 'The Principles of Political 
Economy' and 'The Measure of Value' share in the same idea. 
Malthus said in the latter: he did not think that the labour which a 
commodity would command could properly be considered as a 
standard measure of value, yet he thought it the nearest approxi-
mation to a standard of any object known. And thus the point 
.) D. Ricardo, Note, pp. 40-41. 
lJ R. Maltbus, The Measure Qf Value,. 1823, 1" V, I? 18, 1" 23, Pl" 59-61, 
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above-mentioned has been r~ndered the more obvious' by !The 
-Measure of Value', so he argued. That is all the theory thll.t he 
can reach by dint of his positive inquiries, as they are called. 
Though Malthus professed to adopt positive inquiries based, pn 
experience, he did not take into due consideration the money which 
actually operated as a measure of' value. He certainly admitted 
.'. , ' . 
money to, be a measure of value for commodities, but failed to 
•• ,< • •• • " , ,' .. ,. 
consider it a perfect measure on the ground that its value was not 
invariable. The fact that the money, considered as money commodi· 
ty, also is variable in value independent of the relation of demand 
to supply, will not make the money insufficiently satisfy its function 
as a measure of value. As the alteration in the value of money 
commodity has a simultaneous and equal effect on all kinds of 
commodities, the mutual relation of commodities represented in the 
values measured by the value of money commodity will not vary . 
.of course the prices of commodities, when their value would not 
vary in the process of their continuity in time, would fall if money 
value rises, and reversely rise if money value falls. But a definite 
money commodity will always act as a measure of value. The 
action of a definite money commodity as a measure of value is 
accounted for by the circumstance that commodities together with 
money commodity have been equalized in value. In ftddition, the 
money does not represent directly a given time of labour, but is 
concretely a money commodity. The money will be, therefore, not 
only a measure of value for commodities equalized in value, but 
,also a standard of value as a given weight of metal. It is not liS a 
measure of value, but as a standard of price, that the money is 
represented as a given weight of metal. As the gold of various 
quantities stand in the same relation to one another, however the 
value of gold may vary, the money will not lose its function as of 
a standard of price. 
III. THE ~IGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORY OF 
INCREASED WEALTH 
Malthus's economical arguments, starting from the theory of 
value, have come to reveal their characteristics in handling the 
question, of the accumulation of wealth. In this connection, he 
develops his arguments by inquiring what the most direct and ef-
fective stimulus is for a continued creation and increase of wealth. 
He treated, as the direct causes for the increase of wealth. the 
four factors of the increase of population, the parsimony, the fertility 
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pf land, and the inventions to save labour. Explaining by the· so-
palled 'method of variation' in the current theon' of. equilibrium; the 
eventual effect that one factor alone will vary in the state of equili b-
rium; he has reached the conclusion that it is onlY· over-~aving 
which leads to overproduction. Even in this inference,' Malthus 
tried to resort to a thorough degree to his method of positivism. 
According to his inquiry, people are of the opinion that an increase 
of population. because population is the great source of consumption, 
will keep up the demand for an increase of produce, and according-
ly be accompanied by a continued increase of SUpply. It may be 
readily allowed that a continued increase of population is a power-
ful and necessary element of increasing demand. But that the increase 
of population alone, or more properly speaking, the pressure of 
population against the limits of subsistence does not offer an effec-
tive stimulus to the continued increase of wealth, as Malthus thinks, 
can be confirmed by experience as well as by theory. Namely, 
.where the right of private property is established and the wants of 
society are supplied by industry and barter, any individual's desire, 
to possess the necessaries, conveniences and luxuries of life, how-
.eyer intense it may be, will never serve in their production, if there 
be nowhere an effectual demand for something which he possesses. 
That a man whose labour is his only possession has or has not an effec-
tive demand for produce is dependent upon whether his labour is or 
is not demanded by those who have the disposal of produce. And 
any productive labour can never be demanded unless the produce 
when obtained is greater in value than the labour which obtained it. 
In order to warrant the employment of more people in the production 
of a commodity, there must be something in the previous state 
Clf the demand and supply of the commodity in qUestion or in its 
price, prior to and independent of the demand occasioned by the 
new labourers. Now it will probably be said that the increase of 
population will lower wages and by thus decreasing the costs of 
production will increase the profits· of the capitalists and the 
encouragement to produce. Such a temporary effect may indeed 
take place, but Malthus says that it is evidently very strictly limited. 
The fall of wages, reaching a certain point, must needs not only 
.stop the progress of the population but make it retrograde.' And 
before this point is reached, the increase of produ<;e occasioned by 
the labour of more persons will have so lowered its value ·and 
so reduced profits as to make the capitalists determ ine to employ 
less labour. Malthus therefore considered in theory thit an in-
26 S. KISHIMOTO 
crease of population, when an additional quantity of labour is not 
required, will soon be checked by want of employment and the 
scanty support of those employed, and will not give the stimulus 
necessary for an increase of wealth in proportion to the power of 
production. 
And Malthus says, if any doubts remain concerning the theory 
on this subject, they will surely be dissipated through experience. 
We can see almost always a striking confirmation of what has been 
advanced, if we cast our eyes on any nation of the world. Namely, 
almost universally, the actual wealth of all the countries we know 
of is very far short of their powers of production. And thus Mal-
thus distinctly showed his interest in positive argument. l ) 
Following population, Malthus makes inquiry into the accumula· 
tion of capital, or the saving from revenue to add to capital, con-
sidered as the second stimulus to the increase of wealth. It is 
certainly true that no permanent and continued increase of wealth 
can take place without a continued increase of capital. But Malthus 
argues that we must inquire what is the state of things which in-
cites a nation to accumulate, and further inquire what is the state of 
things which tends to make that accumulation the most effective 
and lead to a further and continued increase of capital .and 
wealth. 
According to Malthus, it is no doubt possible by parsimony to 
devote at once a much larger part than usual of the produce of 
any country to the maintenance of productive labour. And it is quite 
true that the labourers employed in productive labour are consumers 
as well as those engaged in non'productive labour, and accordingly 
as far as the labourers are concerned, there would be a slight 
decrease in consumption or demand. But the consumption and 
demand occasioned by the workmen alone employed in productive 
labour can never furnish a motive for the accumulation and employ-
ment of capital. As for the capitalists themselves, the landlords, and 
other rich persons, they are, by the supposition, one in being par.· 
simonious, and saving from their revenue and adding to their capital 
by doing away with their usual conveniences and luxuries. Under 
these circumstances, it is considered impossible that the increased 
quantity of commodities obtained by the increased number of pro· 
ductive labourers should find purchasers without such a fall of price 
as would probably sink their value below that of the outlay, or at 
I) R. Malthus, PrillcipJes of Po.Utical Ecollomy, 211d ed. 1'. 311 et seq. 
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least reduce produce so as to diminish both the power and the will 
to save. 
In this connection, however, we must take into account Say's 
theory of market. Although there may easily be a glut of particular 
commodities, as the theory says, there cannot possibly- be a glut of 
commodities in general. The fact is that commodities being always 
exchanged for commodities, one half will furnish a market for the 
other half, and production being thus the sole source of demand, an 
excess in the supply of one article merely proves a deficiency in 
the supply of some other, and accordingly a general excess is 
impossible. This doctrine, however, appears to Malthus to be utter' 
ly groundless, and to contradict the principles which regulate supply 
and demand. Namely, it is by no meaps true that commodities are 
always exchanged for commodities. Many commodities are exchang· 
ed directly either for productive or for Unproductive labour. And 
this mass of commodities, compared with the labour for which it is 
to be exchanged, may fall in value due to a glut just as any commo-
dity. falls in value due to a glut, compared with either labour or 
money. According to Malthus, in the supposed case, there would 
obviously be an unusual quantity of commodities of all kinds in the 
market owing to those unproductive labourers who would be con-
verted by the accumulation of capital into productive labourers. The 
number of labourers as a whole being the same, however, and the 
power and will to buy for consumption among landlords and capi-
talists being by supposition decreased, commodities would necessarily 
fall in value compared with labour, and thus greatly lower 
profits and check further production for a little while_ But this 
is just what is meant by the word glut, which in this case is plainly 
general and not partial. 
Say and Ricardo appear to Malthus to have considered commo-
dities as if they were so many mathematical figures, instead of 
articles of consumption, which must be in reference to the num-
bers and wants of consumers. His reason for it is that when in 
this case we compare the numbers and wants of consumers with 
each other, then a great increase of produce with wants diminished 
by parsimony must necessarily occasion a great fall of value esti-
mated in labour, so that the same quantity of labour as before, would 
no longer command the same quantity, and both the power of ac-
cumulation and the mptive to accumulate would be greatly checked. 
It was thus considered by Malthus that if the labouring classes 
be thrown out of employment by pushing the conversion of revenue 
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into capital beyond a certain point, the adoption of parsimonious 
habits beyond a certain point may be accompanied by the most dis-
tressing effects at first, and by a marked depression of wealth and 
population afterwards. It is not of course meant to say. that parsi-
mony or even a temporary decrease of consumption is not often 
absolutely necessary to the increase of wealth. A state may cer-
tainly be ruined by consumption, and on this account a decrease of 
the actual expenditure may be necessary. Not only that, but when 
the capital of a country is deficient, compared with the demand for 
its produce, a temporary economy of consumption is·· necessary for 
the supply of capital which can alone offer the means of an increased 
consumption in future. What particularly Malthus wants to lay 
stress on is that no nation can possibly grow rich by an accumula-
tion of capital which arises from a permanent decrease of consump-
tion. The fact is that as such accumulation is beyond what is want-
ed for supplying the effectual demand for produce, a part of· it 
would very soon lose both its use and value and cease to possess 
the character of wealth . 
. This view of Malthus's is very important. His argument 
against the theory of market is worthy of more attention, as theory 
is t~e representative argument of the classical school adopted by· 
Say, Ricardo, James Mill, etc. Say and others advocated the general 
agreement between the demand and supply of commodities by sup-
posing their mere production, while Malthus argued about both the 
general disagreement between demand and supply, and overproduction, 
arising from parsimony, that is, the accumulation of capital. How-
ever, the conversion of revenue into capital, that is, the accumulation 
of capital is merely the temporarY switch over between demand and 
supply. This is the point against which Ricardo too tries to argue. 
Namely, he denies that the wants of the consumers are decreased by 
parsimony, arguing that they are transferred with the power to 
consume to another group of consumers." By increase of capital 
from revenue he means an increase of consumption by productive 
labourers instead of by unproductive. And he says that consumption 
is as certain in one case as in the other, and the difference is only 
the quantity of production returned. As Ricardo says, parsimony 
serves only to the power of purchase from consumption to capital, 
causing as a whole no disagreement between demand and supply. 
That is, the harmonic circulation of demand and supply will never 
~) P. Ricardo, Note, 1" 164, 1'.174, 
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be cut down by parsimony. 
Due attention should be paid herewith to the fact that Malthus 
endeavoured to cut down the harmonic circulation in the theory of 
market. Asa matter of fact, the destruction of harmonic circulation 
occasioned by the development of the capitalistic economy of the 
19th Century and after has led to critical overproduction, and the 
intermittent occurrence of the destruction has come to expedite the 
business cycle. Though not neglecting from the first, but unable to 
account for the phenomenon, the classical theorists like Say, Ricardo, 
etc. tried to dispel! its exposition out of the general theory on the 
ground that it was after all a temporary and partial phenomenon. 
The so-called positivist Malthus, however, that he is a man of a 
strong sense of actuality, admitting frankly the phenomenon as a 
general fact is surmised to have developed his theory as mentioned 
above. 
In this connection, there are the three points of his theory 
to be taken notice of. First, it is the insecurity of Malthus's positivism, 
which has been originally the confirmation by empirical facts of a 
given or supposed theory. Instead, however, it is more important 
herewith how to theorize a given act, after which only the so-called 
actual proof comes to the fore. 
Secondly, Malthus tries herewith to seek for not a temporary 
and partial alteration, but a permanent and general alteration. This 
is certainly distinct from other parts of his economics, which pays 
respect to an temporary and partial alterations. Though seeking 
for an permanent and general tendency as opposed to Malthus, 
herewith again was Ricardo opposed to Malthus by adversely stress-
ing a temporary and partial alteration. And thus both of them 
proceeded with the solution of the question in their different ways. 
We have to be reminded hereby of the significance of the matter, 
instead of feeling any strangeness and queerness about their argu-
ments. It is indeed a question of essential importance whether the 
capitalistic economy would make a harmonious procession without 
any contradiction or go on intermittently reproducing self-contradic-
tions within it accompanied by critical overproduction. The signifi-
cance of the question can be easily supposed by the circumstances 
that whether to approve or not the facts themselves is more worthy 
of consideration than the authenticity of the theory accounting for 
the facts. 
Thirdly, that Malthus, by acknowledging the fact of general 
overproduction, raised an opposition to the theory of market, which 
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had been considered as if it were an axiom in the classical econo1 
mics, is of great significance, though his arguments came to fail, and 
still more so as he was of an influential faction of the classical 
economics. Furthermore, the failure of Malthus's theory gave a 
greater impetus to the numerous attempts of the later times to 
argue about the fact of general overproduction, and thus these at-
tempts, whether based on classical theories or not, have come to re-
vise or abandon the classical theories as they wished. 
Concerning the fertility of soil as a stimulus to the. CDntinued 
increase of wealth, Malthus assumed a negative attitude by saying 
that the fertility would not necessarily be a stimulus.· This matter 
has been argued by him positively, as is called, in reference to the 
case of various countries. According to his actual study, it may be 
said that no instance has occurred in modern times of a large and 
very fertile country having made full use of its natural resources. 
On the other hand, it may be also said that there has been many 
instances of small and unfertile states having accumulated within 
their narrow limits, by means of foreign commerce, an amount of 
wealth greatly exceeding what could be expected from their physi-
cal capabilities. The fact is that many instances are found where 
the excellent fertility of land would give birth to the indolence of 
people, and thus check the increase of their wealth. For instance, 
the man who can obtain the necessary food for his family by two days' 
labour a week· has the physical power of working much longer to 
obtain conveniences and luxuries than the man who must spend 
four days in obtaining food. If the facility of getting food, however,-
creates habits of indolence, this indolence may make him prefer 
the luxury of doing little or nothing to· the luxury of possessing· 
conveniences and comforts. And in this case, he may spend less 
time in working for conveniences and comforts and more scantily 
obtain them, than when he be obliged to use more industry in· 
obtaining food. After trying to prove the subject practically in 
reference to the cases of various countries, Malthus has come to the 
following conclusion: The excellent fertility of these countries, 
instead of affording an adequate stimulus to a rapid increase of 
wealth and population, had produced, under the current circumstances 
in which they have been placed, some degree of indolence which 
has kept them poor and thinly populated after the lapse of ages; 
or, in general, the fertility of soil alone is not an adequate stimulus 
to the continued increase of wealth . 
. Lastly, may we consider inventions to save labour as a stimulus 
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to the continued increase of wealth? According to Maltus, inventions 
to save labour seldom take place to a great extent. except when 
there is a decided demand for them. They are the natural results 
of progress and civilization. and. in their more perfect forms. gen· 
erally come to aid the land in its failing powers of production. The 
fertility of soil. being a gift of nature. exists whether it is wanted 
or not and therefore must often for many years exceed the power 
of fully using it. Inventions. which substitute machinery for manual 
exertions, being the result of the ingenuity of man and called forth 
by his wants, will rarely exceed those wants, as might be expected. 
But, as Malthus argues, the same law applies to both fertility 
of land and inventions, both coming under the head of facilities of 
production. And in both cases, these facilities cannot be fully used 
unless the power of supply which they furnish be accompanied by 
an adequate extension of market. When a machine is invented, 
which, by saving labour, will bring goods to market at a much 
cheaper rate than before, the following is the most usual effect: as 
the commodity will be brought within the power of a much greater 
number of purchasers, the demand for the commodity will be ex-
tended so much so that the value of the whole goods made by the new 
machinery greatly exceeds their former value, and accordingly more 
hands, instead of fewer, are required in the manufacture, notwith· 
standing the saving of labour. It was therefore considered not easy 
by Malthus to appreciate an enriching power of the introduced 
machinery, or its tendency to increase both the value and quantity 
of domestic commodities. 
The demand or market appeared to Malthus fundamentally to 
control advantages of both the fertility of soil and the technical 
improvement. But it is generally known that facilities of production 
have the strongest tendency to open markets, both at home and 
abroad. Under the actual circumstances, therefore, there are great 
advantages to be expected and little reason to worry about any 
permanent evil from the introduction of machinery. And Malthus 
further argues that the pre-eminent advantages derived from the 
substitution of machinery for manual labour must be greatly de-
creased without the extension of market and the increase of consump-
tion. Namely, the fertility of land and the invention of good 
machinery will both confer a prodigious power of production. But 
neither of these great powers of production can be fully put into 
action, so Malthus considers, if the situation and circumstances, or 
the habits and tastes of society interrupt the opening of sufficient 
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market and an adequate increase of consumption. 
This view of Malthus's is still opposed to Ricardo's. The latter 
comm~nts thus: it is obvious that advantages are derived from the-
extension of market and foreign trade. Improvements in machinery 
with an extensive market abroad will be much more beneficial to 
us than improvements without these advantages. This is, however, 
not the subject in dispute, so argues Ricardo. What we want to 
know is whether improvements can be otherwise than beneficial to 
us under any circumstances." The world therefore maybe cbnsid· 
ere-d as a large country in regard to the use of machinery. So 
considered, Malthus has no objection to the most extensive use of 
machinery. Then, we do not see any reason why a people too 
living in the most limited district, which under some circumstances 
does not have any commerce with foreign countries, would not 
derive un.mixed advantages from the accumulation of capital, im· 
proved fertility of soil, and inventions to save labour. To make them 
beneficial, as Malthus thinks, they must be accompanied by demand. 
As _against this, Ricardo contends that. as he thinks -demand depends 
only on supply the means of obtaining abundance of commodities 
can never be otherwise than those facilities. Herewith again Mal· 
thus's theory was not able to refute the theory of purchase. 
-- Thus has it been made clear that accumulation of -capital, 
fertility of soil, and inventions to save labour, which are considered 
stimulating to production, all act in the same direction. And as-
they all tend to facilitate supply without reference to demand, as 
Malthus concluded, they could neither separately nor conjoiiltly 
afford an adequate stimulus to the continued increase of wealth. 
3) D. Ricardo, Note, p. 194, pp'-197-198. 
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IV. R. MALTHUS AND J. M. KEYNES 
Political economy aims to study empirical matters of economy; 
trying to find the laws which are in operation and govern over 
these matters. Or it is a mass of theories which, based on experi-
ence, are formed under a given supposition, and then principles 
which give interpretation, though abstract, to empirical facts in the 
real world. The interpretation is not to make a mere copy of the 
empirical .facts, but to clarify in a general way the source from 
which their movements flow out. And economical arguments are 
not theoretical themselves, but so in giving a unified interpretation 
to individual facts in the actual world. It means on the other 
hand that they are of a positive character. By a positive character 
it is fundamentally not meant that any assumed theory should be 
confirmed by the evidence of empirical facts, but that the empirical 
facts. should be interpreted above all things. Reality is reticent 
about itself; so there is no other way than to let theory speak 
about reality. Or, individual events are not always showing· essen-
tial matters, and therefore the events may not be relied upon to 
judge the authenticity of theories. But practical economy being 
always inconsistent and variable, theories will account for the empi. 
rical facts of variable character, and sometimes, by revising them-
selves, interpret the altered realities. It might be said with reason 
therefore that the so-called positivism is not neglecting a theoretical 
study, but represents only one part of the study. 
It is true that the political economy since the days of Adam 
Smith made an advance in its theoretical study when Malthus 
endeavored to complete its positive part. Should it be said, how-
ever, that the positivism displayed its due function? In his theory of 
value, Malthus transformed the matter of value into the matters· 
concerriing the relation of demand to supply in price. Price is an 
empirical fact, while value is a theoretical existence. Malthus ought 
to have accounted for the empirieal facts of price by the theory of 
value. But in fact, he tried to explain the theoretical value by the 
empirical relation of demand to supply. That was his positivism.· 
That is why he lost the significance of the theory of value. Mean-
while, he tried, by his so-called positivism, to seek for the other 
part of the empirical facts of variable character. The part is the 
fact of economic fluctuation. The theoretical study of value would 
not always make it difficult to solve the matters concerning the· 
economic fluctuation, but Malthus's failure in the theory of value 
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happened to incite him further to study the economic fluctuation. 
He did so with good reason, because the economic fluctuation is 
indeed the best object in view for the so·called positivism to ap-
proach. 
His theory of economic fluctuation played its most conspicuous 
part in the study of the factors which promoted the increase of 
wealth. Here the economic fluctuation has been studied which are 
caused by one factor when others are kept invariable by the method 
of variation. This made a foreru~ner of the dYnamic theory to 
which a foundation was laid by J. B. Clark, J. Schumpeter, etc. 
The equilibrium .reasoned by the theory of market might be con-
sidered to be its premise. Though Say's theory of market which was 
started by Smith's system of natural liberty was adopted by Ricardo, 
James Mill, etc., becoming thus the main current of the classical 
economics, Malthus, Smith's pupil as he was, owing to his strong 
sehse of reality, tried to cut down the harmonic circulation of the 
theory of purchase by the theory of oversaving and thus acknowl· 
edged theoretically the reality of a general overproduction. 
It is certain that variations since the panic of 1815 have under· 
mined the foundation of the past theory. The evils of this panic 
made Robert Owen of England and S. Sismondi of France to denounce 
the contradiction of the capitalistic economy. In the IPrinciples of 
Political Economy', Malthus developed the principles opposed to the 
theory of porchase and in the end of the book applied in his ar· 
gument the principles to the difficult conditions of the working class 
after the year of 1815. Even Ricardo, in a chapter added to the 
'Principles of Political Economyl, 3rd edition, 1821, admitted that in 
the capitalistic society the introduction of machinery would not always 
bring benefits to the working class. Actual variations gave impetus 
to the revision of theories, this tendency being actively intensified 
by the so·called positivism, but a new theory was hard to be formed. 
English economics, pressed often by the necessity of solving actual 
problems, could not afford to re-establish a theory. 
At the turn of this century, however, this theoretical question· 
was carried over, for its solution, to the time after the World War I. 
The general panic after the World War I was indeed very 
similar to that after the Napoleonic wars one century ago. Here 
also, as ever before, there needs to be taken into consideration 
overproduction, its accompanying unemployment, and criticism on 
the theory of equilibrium in the classical economics. It is just· 
Keynes who here played a Malthusian part. He, who was original· 
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ly a follower of the classical economics, came to be in opposition to 
its theory of equilibrium in connection with the solution of the question 
of employment after the war. He tried to approach the question like 
Malthus, giving more priority to demand or consumption than to 
supply. . 
The classical economics of Say and Ricardo have taught that 
supply creates its own demand.') Accordingly an individual act of 
abstaining from consumption necessarily causes the labour and com· 
modities thus released from supplying consumption to be invested in 
the production of capital wealth. The doctrine has been adopted by 
J. S. Mill as well. And, though not stated in its crude form by 
Marshall, Edgeworth, Pigou, etc., the doctrine has been made the 
basis of their theories. 
According to Keynes, however, the effective demand of the 
whole of society which determines the amount of employment 
consists of a demand paid up for consumption and a demand paid 
up for investment, and the increase and decrease of the former 
will not necessarily be offset and made up by the reversely corre·· 
sponding increase and decrease of the latter. It is the propensity of 
consumption that commands the demand for consumption, and it is 
the relation of marginal efficiency of capital to rate of interest that 
commands the demand for investment. It is necessary, therefore, to 
induce these three incentives for the enlargement of employment. 
When a country is growing in wealth somewhat rapidly, the further 
progress of this happy state of affairs is liable to be interrupted, in 
conditions of la issez·fa ire, by the insufficiency of the inducements to· 
new investment. Given the social and political environment and the 
national characteristics which determine the propensity to consume, 
the well·being of a progressive state depends on the sufficiency of 
such inducements. They may be found either in home investment· 
or in foreign investment, which together make up aggregate invest· 
ment. In conditions where the quantity of aggressive investment 
is determined by the profit motive alone, the opportunities for home 
investment will be governed in the long run by the domestic rate of 
interest, while the volume of foreign investment is necessarily deter· 
mined by the size of the favourable balance of trade. Thus, ina 
society where there is no question of direct investment under the 
protection of the state, the economic objects with which the govern·· 
1) J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Intevest and Money, 1936, 
pp. 18-19 
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ment Should necessarily be preoccupied, are considered to be the-
domestic rate of interest and the balance of foreign trade. And this 
is just what was taken notice of by the Mercantilism, which had 
preceded the classical economics, and the reason why Keynes paid 
high tribute to the Mercantilists as his forerunner." 
Particularly the Mercantilists' theory of the low-rate of interest 
is highly respected by Keynes. The doctrine says that the rate of 
interest is not self-adjusting at a level best suited to the social 
advantage but constantly tends to rise too high, so that a wise 
government wants to curb it by statute and custom and even by break-
ing the regulations of the moral law. This may be considered as a 
heretical doctrine by the classical economics, but just a correct view, 
so regards Keynes, repudiating a natural equlibrium. , 
Keynes also finds in Mercantilism the view repudiating the in· 
sufficiency of -the propensity to consume, that is, under-consumption, 
which appears as the evils of unemployment. In this co·nnection 
Barbon argued that prodigality was a vice that is prejudicial to 
man, but not to trade, and this Barbon's opinion, according to Keynes, 
was· popularlised by Bernard de Mandeville's'Fable of the Bees'. 
. It is with good reason therefore that Keynes took notice of the 
theory of under-consumption advocated by Malthus in the Nineteenth· 
Century, taking it as one of a series of such doctrines. J. A. Hobson 
and A. F. Mummery's work, 'Physiology of Industry' (1889), which 
is regarded by Keynes as a forerunner of the doctrine at the present 
time, might be said without exaggeration to be in the long run a 
revival of Malthus who was representing the zenith of the classical 
economics. As a matter of fact, Keynes was converted into a Mal-
thusian protestant, so to speak, in protest against the Ricardian 
classical economics, and his work 'The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest, and Money', is indeed his proclamation of it. In his 
preface to the Japanese version of the work too, he has pointed out 
that Malthus is more significant at present than Ricardo. When 
Keynes discussed Malthus, he, quoting Malthus's letter addressed to 
Ricardo which rejected the theory of purchase and stressed the 
theory of underconsumption, stated that one could not rise from a 
perusal of that correspondence without feeling that the almost total 
obliteration of Malthus's line of approach and the complete domi-
nation of Ricardo's for a period of a hundred years has been a 
disaster to the progress of economics; and that if only Malthus, 
') J. M. Keynes, op. cit. p. 333, p. 351, p. 358, 
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instead of Ricardo. has been the parent stern from which the 
Nineteenth Century economics had its start, what a much wiser and 
richer place the world would be to·day.') It certainly remains to be stud· 
ied whether or not the question of Ricardo vs. Malthus of a hundred 
years ago has been quite solved at present as the question of Pigou 
vs. Keynes, but it is highly necessary that we should definitely 
grasp the purport of Keyne's economics and the part it plays. 
Outwardly it has appeared of itself pressed by the necessity of 
solving the question of post·war unemployment, but in reality it is 
none other th:.ln the struggle for establishing the theory which repu· 
diates the theory of purchase that has been kept up by the classical 
economists for the past one hundred years. Weare thus the more 
impressed by the slowness in the progr.ess of political economy. 
') J. M. Keynes, Essays in Biography, 1933. pp. 140-141, p. 144 . 
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